I. Introduction
Let's begin with some stories.
McDonald's Coffee. Stella Liebeck ordered coffee at a McDonald's drive-through and promptly spilled it on her lap. Because of her absorbent sweat pants, she suffered severe burns. She sued, and a jury awarded her $2.86 million, cut by the judge to $650,000. Eventually, Liebeck and McDonald's settled out of court. 1 Spill, sue, go home with $2.86 million. The courts-as-demented-slot-machines story shocked most readers, and the case's eventual settlement got buried in the newspapers' back pages. As odd as the bizarre verdict, however, was the positive press it earned among legal professionals. Predictably, the trade association for the plaintiffs' bar (formerly the American Trial Lawyers Association; now pleasantly renamed the American Association for Justice) celebrated the award as a victory for justice. More curiously, even prominent law professors found good things to say about $2.86 million for a coffee spill. 2 Chipotle's Wheelchair. Maurizio Antoninetti wheeled himself into a Chipotle Mexican Grill and complained about the service-line counters. Set at a height convenient for those who could walk, they were too high for Antonietti. The restaurant said it would happily show him the food in cups or at a private table, but Antonietti would have none of that. He sued.
The Americans with Disabilities Act entitled him to "reasonable accommodation," he argued, and a special viewing at a special table was inferior. He wanted the full "Chipotle experience." For that, the franchise needed to install lower counters.
The 9 th Circuit found for Antonietti, and granted injunctive relief. The chain was required to install lower counters --counters convenient for wheelchaired customers and inconvenient for everyone else. And because the District Court had awarded Antonietti only $136,537 in attorney's fees, the Circuit Court remanded the case to give him more.
Since immigrating to the United States in 1990, Antoninetti had sued more than twenty businesses over service quality. Only once had he ever returned to an establishment, the Court acknowledged, but it declared that point irrelevant. The restaurant owed wheelchair customers lower counters whether Antoninetti would ever eat there again or not. 3 Cigarettes. In the 1990's, Mississippi plaintiffs' lawyer Richard "Dickie" Scruggs sued cigarette companies on behalf of 46 states. By convincing consumers that smoking was safe, he argued, the companies had increased the Medicaid bills that state governments had to pay. That anyone in the last half century really thought smoking safe was unclear. Rather clearer was that smoking, by killing its victims quickly and early, reduces --rather than increases --government health care and pension costs. 4 But never mind such questions. Under the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, the companies agreed to restrict their marketing and lobbying and to pay $246 billion dollars over 25 years ($900 million to Scruggs's law firm). 5 And the intellectual class cheered. The New York Times applauded the settlement and lamented only that the regulatory strictures were not harsher still. 6 A reader might think Americans use litigation in place of legislation and regulation. He might think judges wield enormous and capricious power. He might think litigants unpredictably manipulate the power of the state by using (or abusing) a judicial branch immune from any democratic checks. He might also think that for American businesses, law is as important as commerce. Making a good product at low cost is all well and good, of course. But retaining a top-flight law firm to protect the firm's assets against those would judicially expropriate them would seem a sensible first priority.
If true, the need to protect one's firm from judicially sanctioned theft is a distinctively American exigency. It is not a story one hears about other wealthy democracies, common though it is in poorer countries. What is more, the intellectual impulse instinctively to defend these outcomes also seems uniquely American. Courts in other countries do issue bizarre opinions from time to time-. Idiocy knows no boundaries. But "tort reform" as a major policy issue is a peculiarly American debate.
We undertook this project to quantify the use of courts across countries. Quickly, however, we realized that we could not reliably measure what really matters. The theoretical problems lay in identifying measurable phenomena that accurately reflect the impact of courts. The empirical problems stemmed from the high aggregation level of the data available.
That data does indicate, however, that for routine contract, tort, and property disputes, courts in America perform about as well as in other wealthy countries. The notoriety of the U.S. legal system does not stem from these routine disputes. It stems instead from the abysmal performance of U.S. courts when they encounter certain highprofile disputes. Aggregate numbers are not informative about this kind of dysfunction, though much can be said about it, as we will do in the last part of this chapter. Table 1 shows a number of proxies for the use of the courts across six wealthy democracies. We will discuss them as a group first, and then review the proxies individually.
II. Comparative Litigation
Note first that although each of the proxies plausibly measures court usage, the proxies do not correlate with each other very closely. The U.S. has about a quarter more suits per capita than does the U.K., but 3.3 times as many as Canada. It has fewer judges per capita than France, but four times as many as the U.K. It has 17 times as many lawyers per capita as Japan, but the same number as Australia. It has twice the motor vehicle insurance costs of Australia, but lower costs than Canada. Sources: Various ---see later sections of this chapter. Notes. Explanations of these numbers are important and are given later in the chapter. The top three rows are for England, and the bottom three for the United Kingdom, since Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems.
Note second that America is not special. From the stories that dominate the newspapers, our courts seems crazed. Yet most litigation involves nothing like those bizarre disputes and so they only lightly affect measures such as suits filed or the number of judges. Ordinary litigation involves car crashes and broken contracts. These disputes dominate the courts. All six countries use courts to resolve this kind of dispute, and the courts resolve them similarly, maintaining stable property rights and facilitating efficient investment. Indeed, a central reason these countries are wealthy is that their courts handle these routine disputes well.
2. Their significance. -- Table 1 's level of aggregation tells us about what we might call "first-order law": the typical disputes over automobile accidents and contract claims. Countries differ in how well their courts handle these mundane disputes. Even among wealthy democracies some courts handle them more efficiently than others. But compared to developing economies even the least efficient does reasonably well. Despite the bewildering array of organizations and procedures, the end results are similar.
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American notoriety stems instead from what we might call "second-order law": coffee spills, ADA suits, and tobacco settlements. These cases generate controversy, make a few trial lawyers rich, and provoke relentless calls for reform. This law can profoundly affect social relations and the economy, but not because the cases are common or even because they transfer large amounts of money. Rather, the measurable, litigated, cases cause households and firms to take expensive precautions of little social value.
The U.S. is exceptional not in how it handles first-order law (the rest of this Section II), but in how it handles second-order law (Section III). In the typical accident or contract claim, U.S. courts do reasonably well. They may face somewhat more litigation than other rich democracies, but not much. In the second-order cases, however, the U.S. courts entertain claims that courts in other well-functioning economies would dismiss in short order. In the process, they necessarily create a drag on American business. As was said some time ago:
Increasingly, the civil justice system seems to be two different systems. One is a stable system that provides modest compensation for plaintiffs who claimed slight or moderate injuries in automobile and other accidents that have been the major source of litigation for 50 years. The second is an unstable system that provides continually increasing awards for claims for serious injuries in any type of lawsuit, and for all injuries, serious or not, in product liability, malpractice, street hazards and workplace accidents. Additionally, plaintiffs filed 272,000 new civil suits in federal District Courts, including 34,000 contract claims, 4,000 real property claims, and 77,000 tort claims (15,000 of them relating to asbestos). The rest of the claims were statutory: 53,000 prisoner petitions, 32,000 civil rights cases, 19,000 labor law cases, 13,000 social security claims, and 11,000 intellectual property disputes.
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Within the state courts, case composition varies widely. In Kansas, 89% were contract disputes and 5% small claims, while in Wisconsin 16% were contracts disputes and 64% small claims. Among seven states reporting detailed composition data, tort cases ranged from 1.5% to 8.0% of the total. (CSP-2007, p. 2). Small claims comprised 44 percent of incoming civil cases. General civil cases --tort, contract, and real property cases not filed as small claims --were 37 percent, most of them contract cases (Civil Caseloads, at 21).
The federal government surveyed state filings that went to trial (Langton and Cohen). The parties settled or abandoned 97% of cases in courts of general jurisdiction, though of the cases that did go to trial, 61% were torts. Consistent with the phenomenon of "the vanishing trial," 11 in the nation's 75 most populous counties the number of general civil cases disposed of by trial declined 50% from 1992 to 2005.
3. Japan. --In 2008, disputants filed 2.3 million civil cases in the Japanese courts at all levels, 12 a majority of them (1.4 million) in summary courts with jurisdiction over claims of less than 1.4 million yen (Courts Act, Sec. 32; in Aug. 2010, $1.00 = 85 yen).
Many of these "cases" involved petitions for various orders in insolvency or other specialized proceedings. Of the 2.3 million newly filed cases, Japanese courts catalogued 4. England and Wales. --In England and Wales, plaintiffs filed 2.01 million civil suits in county courts in 2007. In addition, they filed 127,664 family law cases. 13 As in the U.S. and Japan, most suits involved "money claims." Of 2 million filings in 2007, 1.6 million were money claims, 284,000 were for recovery of land, 8,000 for return of goods, and 67,000 for insolvency. 14 5. Canada. --In the year ending 2009, plaintiffs filed 324,015 general civil cases (including small claims) in the seven Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta, B.C., Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. They filed another 175,628 family law cases. An English colony, a common-law legal system, a North-American neighbor --yet Canada has but a quarter of the litigation in the U.S. Indeed, it has less litigation per capita even than the famously "non-litigious" Japanese.
6. Australia. --Like the U.S. and Canada, Australia maintains a federal structure for its courts. It couples one federal (i.e., national) court system, with separate court systems in each of its eight states. We were able to obtain data on court filings for six of the eight, an area with about 90 percent of the Australian population. Plaintiffs in these states filed 302,000 suits (allocating the federal filings by population). people file non-family civil suits in court. They only haphazardly proxy for the role courts play in society. Although the number of filings might seem to measure that role, consider the following three complications.
a. Small-claims courts. If one were interested in the extent to which people use the courts to resolve economically substantial disputes, however, one might want to exclude the very smallest claims. And if one wanted to measure the role courts played in society, a small suit obviously should count for less than a large one. Since states and countries differ in their cutoffs, however, omitting small-claims courts could be highly misleading; one country's figure might still include mostly petty disputes while another's did not.
b. The definition of "case''. The same category of disputes does not generate the same number of cases in every country. Take divorce, which in the U.S., will almost always lead to a measured case: to divorce, a couple generally must file a suit in court. By contrast, in Japan most divorces never enter court records. To part ways, a couple simply goes to city hall and enters a divorce on the "family registry." Only when they can't agree on the divorce terms will they appear in family court. Only 12 percent of divorces end up in court, and only 1 percent actually go to trial. 16 Naturally, American couples would thus appear to be more litigious.
Or suppose John Doe reneges on his credit card debt. In any country, if the lender wants to force him to pay it will need to file suit. It may try a variety of extralegal harassing tactics first, but to get at Doe's bank account or paycheck, court permission is needed. If instead, Doe borrows at a pawn shop and does not pay, the lender merely keeps (and eventually sells) the pawned object. The dispute becomes a case only if the borrower wants to force the lender to return the object pawned. As a result, the number of cases filed in court will depend on the relative prevalence of creditcard and pawn-shop finance in the consumer credit market ---which will vary from country to country.
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Pawnshops do not make headlines, but they do matter to aggregate statistics. In the U.S., for example: a 1988 study found 6,853 pawnshops making an estimated 35 million loans per year. In Tokyo, only 700 pawn shops remain today --most consumer instead borrow through credit cards, real estate mortgages, and unsecured loans. In 1955, however, over 21,000 pawn shops operated in Japan. Japanese file more suits today than they did in 1955. Part of that increase, however, reflects neither legal nor cultural change. It merely reflects the shift in consumer finance technology from pawn shop loans to unsecured lending through the formal financial sector. 18 c. Predictability. How often plaintiffs sue also turns on courts' predictability. 19 Litigation is more expensive than settlement. If the disputants know that the court will award amount X, they can just transfer the X by themselves and pocket the fees they would otherwise have paid their lawyers. If you know what a judge will do anyway, why pay to have a trial in two years and ask him?
Disputants litigate rather than settle only if they each hold optimistic estimates of their prospects in court. Because they face higher expenses if they litigate than if they settle, that cost difference creates a "settlement window." So long as the difference in their estimates of the litigated outcome is smaller than that settlement window, they both gain by settling. Only if they disagree enough about what the judge will do will they pay their lawyers and take their chances.
If we want to measure court activity, then we do want the number of filings and trials rather than the amount of claims asserted in the shadow of the law. A country with more erratic courts (e.g., the United States with its civil juries) will have more litigation than a country with predictable courts (e.g., Japan with its bureaucratic judges). On the other hand, if we want to measure the amount of wealth transferred according to legal rules, then we would instead like to include settlements. For example, we might define "litigious" citizens to include disputants who extract damages by asserting their legally protected rights even if they rationally and self-interestedly settle their claims. Under that definition, a country might be "litigious" even with few suits or judges per capita.
Traffic accidents in Japan. The course of traffic accident disputes in Japan illustrates this dynamic. As Japan emerged from the devastation of World War II, very few people owned cars. By the 1960s, the economy was growing at double-digit rates each year. Increasingly, Japanese chose to spend what they earned on automobiles. As they did, they increasingly killed each other on the roads. Accidents boomed, and so did litigation (even without a change in the court system, to recall our earlier point).
After traffic accident cases began to increase rapidly, the Tokyo District Court established a special traffic section in 1962. As Dan Foote (1995) recounts, the new panel immediately found itself swamped. Quickly, the traffic section realized it had to routinize its treatment of cases. At first, it kept its formulas internal to the courts. It published handbooks for judges detailing its "rules of thumb for damages" and standards on comparative negligence. In time, however, the Tokyo traffic section took its dissemination efforts beyond the courts. It began announcing its rules to the bar and the public. Although they increasingly took their disputes out of the courts during the 1970s, Japanese traffic-accident disputants still settled by the expected court outcome. Ramseyer and Nakazato compared the amounts paid by automobile insurers in wrongful death claims with the amounts awarded the heirs to accident victims in court.
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In virtually all cases where heirs would have had legal claims against drivers, they obtained compensation from the drivers' insurers. Out of court, they collected mean amounts that closely tracked the mean amounts courts would have awarded.
Thus, cases filed per capita do not provide a good measure even of first-order law, if by that we mean the extent to which the courts are influential in resolving first-order disputes. They provide a somewhat better measure of how much the courts decide directly rather than indirectly, but even then they do not provide a good measure of the importance of the wealth transfers.
C. Judges per Capita:
1. The numbers. --As an alternative index for the role courts play in society, take the number of judges. This would address to some extent the problem of suits varying in importance, since more important suits require more time from judges.
In Given its federal structure, Canada employs judges in both its federal (national) and provincial courts. It had about 80 federal judges, and 1,100 state judges, or 3.3 per 100,000 population.
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Australia similarly employs judges and magistrates in both federal and state courts. It has about 100 federal judges, and about 740 state judges, or 4.00 judges per 100,000 population.
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The French courts employ 7,896 Magistrats de l'ordre judiciaire. 31 Per 100,000 population, that's 12.47.
2. Qualifications. Our discussion of the English courts shows that measuring the number of judges is not as simple as it seems, since "judge" is an ambiguous term when several different levels of adjudicators exists. Moreover, we lightly passed over the problem that judges deal with criminal as well as civil cases, and the ratio between the two cases differs between countries. As with the number of suits filed, however, the problem with the number of judges lies less in the numbers themselves than in their significance. time to time, observers use the number of judges to proxy for the demand for judicial services. Implicitly, they suggest that governments appoint the judges they do because people file the lawsuits they do. In fact, however, causation just as plausibly runs the other way. People may file the suits that they do because of the number of judges the government has appointed. With more judges, trial dates will come sooner, and plaintiffs will sue more and have less time to settle. 2. Qualifications. --As often discussed, 34 the number of lawyers captures the social importance of law only imperfectly at best. In many societies, lawyers sell services only tangentially related to the law and unrelated entirely to courts. In other societies, a wide variety of non-lawyers sell law-and court-related services. Some lawyers do litigate, of course. In Japan, until recently they seldom did anything else. Because the government recognized their monopoly only on litigation-related services, they focused on litigation. In the U.S., only a minority of lawyers actually litigate. And in the U.K., all barristers traditionally litigated, while no solicitors did. In some countries, lawyers counsel. Although in Japan traditionally lawyers rarely gave business or personal advice, in the U.S. most lawyers do routinely. In the U.K. solicitors give business advice, while barristers did not. Some lawyers do nothing legal at all. Many American lawyers abandon their legal practice within a few years. Elsewhere, lawyers stay with their profession their entire life.
Some countries may have few licensed lawyers, while a wide variety of nonlawyers sell legal services. Again, take Japan. Among the countries in Table 1 , it has the fewest lawyers: less than a tenth as many as the U.S., England, Canada, or Australia, and less than half as many as France. The reason is simple: for most of the post-war 32 This is explained in George L. Priest, "Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem,'' Boston University Law Review, 69 (1989) period, the government set the pass rate on the bar exam below 3 percent. Even when they could not afford (or even find) a lawyer, however, Japanese citizens could buy legal services. They could turn to licensed tax agents for tax advice. They could consult licensed patent agents on intellectual property. They could obtain wills and corporate charters from notary publics. And firms could obtain their corporate and contract advice by hiring unlicensed graduates of the many college law departments.
Given these objections, some scholars look not at licensed legal practitioners, but at university graduates with legal training. By this metric, Japan has more legal experts even than the U.S. Using this approach, Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny index the amount of rent-seeking in a society by the size of university law departments. 35 Averaging across a large number of countries, both developed and developing, they find that the more law graduates in a society, the slower its GDP will grow. Conversely, the more engineering students it graduates, the faster that GDP will grow. The example of Japan versus the United States shows that this approach is fraught with peril: not all those with undergraduate law degrees work in the law business, just as not all those with history degrees work in the history business.
E. Ease of Doing Business:
In its well-known "Doing Business" studies, the World Bank measures the difficulty of performing various small business tasks in different countries. The specificity of the tasks measured is an attractive feature of the approach. Table 6 shows the results the Bank obtained for the difficulty of enforcing a contract. 36 According to the Bank, firms in our six wealthy democracies require similar numbers of procedures to enforce a deal. They will spend 300-400 days in all of the countries except Canada, and consume 14-24 percent of the money at stake.
We include sub-Saharan Africa in Table 6 to show how first-order measures differ between developed and developing countries. The region includes primarily dysfunctional economies and the legal framework in the area reflects (and contributes to) the dysfunction. A sub-Saharan firm that tried to enforce a contract in court would file nearly 40 procedures, spend over 600 days, and consume nearly half of its claim. 
------------------------------------------------

Contract disputes are an important area of first-order disputes. A very different way to measure the efficiency of the courts, at least for developed countries, is through insurance data. Take two countries, A and B. In country A, the courts handle first-order disputes efficiently. The courts sent clear signals about liability and damages. Victims, drivers, and insurers can readily ascertain whether a driver owes money and, if he does, how much. In country B, the courts send only confused signals. If the parties try to learn the driver's liability in court, they find that litigation entails high costs and the result is unpredictable. Suppose that drivers in the two countries cause the same number of accidents, and that the courts value human life at the same level. Given the higher administrative costs involved, insurance will cost more in B than in A. If country B's courts also consistently overestimate the extent of liability and damages, insurance costs will be still higher.
In Table 7 , we give the OECD's estimates of the mean automobile insurance costs in various countries. Among the 22 countries, only in Canada and Ireland do drivers face higher costs than in the U.S. Where American drivers pay $1,464 per car, British drivers pay $924. French drivers pay only $786, Japanese pay $754, and Australians $664. The data suggest American courts handle first-order disputes quite badly. -
-----------------
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The numbers in Table 7 are misleading, however. Insurance rates are secondhighest in the U.S. because Americans drive more and crash more. Look at Table 8 . The number of traffic deaths per car in the U.S. is second highest. The number of traffic accidents per car in the U.S. is second highest. And the distance travelled per car in the U.S. is the very highest. Given how far Americans drive their cars, how many accidents they have, and how many people they kill, insurance premia do not seem out of line. Sources: OECD, International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (IRTAD), http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/irtad/.
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-----------------As a final measure of litigation, we mention the analysis of tort costs by the consulting firm Towers-Perrin-Tillinghast (now part of Towers-Watson), well known for its measurements of tort costs over time in the United States. Its annual U.S. estimates, still coming out each year, use the extensive data on insurance premiums collected by A.M. Best for sale primarily to businesses, with adjustments for such things as selfinsurance. Those reports describe methodology clearly and break down the data into categories that allow its construction to be understood. Its international studies, however, which ended in 2006, do not describe their methodology or data sources. 37 Aside from the OECD data that we used for the discussion of motor insurance earlier, we are not aware of international data sources that would be available, so we are skeptical of the numbers in Table 9 . Nonetheless, because they are so well-known we reproduce them below. Most of the measures we examined above suggest that America is not that unusual. In suits per capita, the ratio between the US and the UK is less than between the UK and Canada. Americans do have more judges per capita, but fewer than the French, and "judge" is hard to define anyway. Americans have the most lawyers per capita, but not many more than Australians. And Americans seem not to find contracts especially hard to enforce or to face unusually high automobile insurance premia.
Why, then, the American notoriety? It does not result from the way the legal system handles routine disputes. Instead, it derives from more special areas of law. We will look at two as examples: securities class actions and asbestos torts. Although aggregate quantitative measures suggest that litigation in the U.S. does not differ substantially from litigation elsewhere, aggregation over myriad categories can easily hide a myriad of sins. In several discrete areas, American courts function in a manner one can only describe as disastrous.
B. Securities Class Actions: 1. The mechanism. --Within the U.S. legal system, class actions are a particular scourge. A small fraction of suits, they wreak havoc out of proportion to their numbers. As a form of group litigation, they have antecedents in colonial times. As "class actions," they date to Rule 23 of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But in their modern, rampantly abused form they date to the 1967 revisions of Rule 23.
The drafters of the modern class action tried to designed a mechanism that would let victims cost-effectively prosecute claims for wrongs that impose large losses on the community as a whole but trivial damages on any one victim. Suppose a firm negligently pollutes and causes damages of $1 million to nearby land. If one person owns that land, he will sue for the $1 million. For damages that large, it is worth hiring a lawyer. With a credible threat to sue, he can demand $1 million in settlement out of court.
Suppose the firm had not one but 1,000 neighbors, each owning a small piece of the damaged land. The firm has caused the same aggregate injury, but no one of the victims could hire a lawyer for less than the amount he could win in court. Since none of the 1,000 would sue, none could credibly threaten to sue. Unable to threaten credibly, none would recover anything out of court.
Suboptimal precautions will result. If the firm faced one neighbor, it would pay for any negligence, and therefore would adopt efficient precautions against pollution. Facing 1,000 neighbors, it escapes liability for its negligence and so neglects precautions. The class-action suit eliminates that misincentive by imposing the same incentives the firm would face if just one person owned the land.
So far, so good. But there is a hitch. Someone has to initiate the suit. Under the U.S. system, a lawyer with an eye for an opportunity masterminds the class-action suit. He identifies a legal wrong and locates several victims. He suggests that they retain him to sue on behalf of them and all others "similarly situated." They and the others have the right to "opt out" of the litigation and pursue their claims independently. Should they not opt out, they will find themselves bound by whatever outcome the lawyer obtains: the suit has "claim preclusive" effect. The clients are too scattered to control the lawsuit, so the lawyer does that. As an incentive, he collects a contingency fee.
The class action mechanism is a creature almost exclusively of the American legal system. Although some European countries have considered adopting the class action, the main venues that have done so are a few Canadian provinces, Australia, and Brazil. 38 Why not adopt, if the incentive effect is so desirable?
2. Problems. --Agency problems plague the attorney-client relationship in the best of situations, but class actions reach the ultimate in agency slack. Because each plaintiff has only a small stake in the litigation, no one of them even tries to monitor the lawyer. He operates as an autonomous actor: independent, unmonitored, and free to pursue his own interests. As the pre-eminent class-action lawyer William Lerach once infamously bragged (now, for his litigation tactics, a convicted felon): "I have the best practice in the world. I have no clients."
The class-action attorney's misaligned incentives particularly skew settlements. Given the trivial size of their claim, few victims pay attention to settlement bargaining. The defendant can take advantage of that by negotiating a settlement that is generous to the lawyers and stingy to his clients. The attorney agrees to take a generous fee, always in cash, and a much smaller recovery for his clients, often "in-kind" as free samples of the defendant's product.
The class-action rules do require the judge to approve any settlement, precisely to avoid this problem. Because the attorneys for both sides favor the settlement, however, nobody will criticize it in court. Accustomed to an adversarial system in which they seldom take initiative, judges defer. They are busy people. They like to please at least some of the people in front of them. And they are linked by social interactions, gratitude for appointment (if by "merit panel"), the old school tie, or campaign contributions to attorneys, defense and plaintiff, not to citizens without J.D.'s. Too often, the important conflict is not between the plaintiff and the defense with the judge staying neutral, but between the lawyers and the non-professionals.
3. Securities class actions. --Even within class actions, securities claims are notorious. Attorneys locate firms whose share price has fallen. They then argue that the firms (or the firms' officers, whom the firms will typically indemnify) caused the fall through misconduct---mismanagement, conflicts of interest, or misrepresentations. To recover the loss in the firm's market capitalization, the attorneys sue on behalf of the shareholders.
Until the mid-1990s, judges named a firm to the lucrative "lead attorney" role if it filed the first claim. Filing first, asking questions later, attorneys raced to the courthouse when share prices fell, and looked for misconduct later. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was supposed to change that. The Act told judges to pick as lead plaintiffs those with the largest financial claims rather than those who file first. According to Stephen Choi and Adam Pritchard (2009: 113-15), however, the problem remained. The trial lawyers simply switched their effort from racing to the courthouse to courting institutional investors. Commercial mutual funds generally rejected being plaintiffs, so attorneys mostly recruited the more politicized governmentsponsored funds and labor union pension plans.
Any financial gain to investors from even a successful suit is minimal. Suppose a firm settles for $30 million---a third to the attorneys and two thirds to the plaintiffs. Because the firm pays the settlement, its market value falls even more. In effect, the firm's current shareholders pay the damages. Because the settlement goes to the shareholders at the time of the alleged misconduct (many of whom still own their shares in the firm), those former shareholders receive cash. The settlement reduces the value of the stock held by one group of investors, increases the cash held by an overlapping group of investors (but by one third less, subtracting the lawyers fees), and enriches the law firm that engineers the transfer. Yet to settle these few suits firms pay dearly. In 2009, there were 221 new filings. The mean settlement value that year was 13 million dollars, the total was 2.8 billion, and the total attorney fees plus expenses were .963 billion. 39 The problem is not that firms lose in court. Of 238 suits filed in 2000, by mid-2010 the parties had settled 146 and judges had thrown out 85. Of the remaining 7, only 4 had gone to trial --and the parties settled all 4 before the verdict. More generally, since the 1995 PSLRA, plaintiffs have filed over 3,400 securities class actions in federal courts, and only 27 went to trial, about 1 in 1,000. Of those, plaintiffs won 6 and obtained a mixed verdict in 5. Thus, of the 3,400 suits since 1995, plaintiffs won anything at all in court in only 11. 40 Nonetheless, firms have paid out massive amounts. In 60 percent of cases, the defendants settle, most for 20 to 60 million dollars, but some for more. The largest 10 settlements up to July 2010 transferred over 1 billion dollars each, the largest being Enron's 7.2 billion dollars in 2010 and WorldCom's 6.2 billion dollars in 2005. 41 The few other countries with class action provisions manage to avoid these large transfers. Australia introduced class actions in 1992. In no year since have attorneys filed more than 6 securities class actions. The trade association for the plaintiff's bar gives even more, and more overwhelmingly to Democrats. That group in 2008 gave over $3 million to politicians, 95 percent to Democrats. 45 It lobbies hard against tort reform of all kinds and particularly hard against reform of the securities class action. By all odds, it was because of ATLA pressure that Bill Clinton vetoed the 1995 PSLRA, only to find himself over-ridden by the heavily Republican Senate. 46 For a sense of the color involved, consider a phone call one of us received in the mid-1990s. At the time, Ramseyer taught at the University of Chicago Law School. The call came from an associate at a well-known law firm specializing in securities class actions. The associate explained that they wanted to retain Ramseyer in connection with a suit against a certain large Japanese corporation. The law firm had filed suit in an American state court, alleging misstatements in the firm's Japanese securities filings. "What did the firm misstate," Ramseyer asked. "We don't know," the associate answered. "That's why we want to retain you." It was enough that the stock price had fallen; the excuse to sue could always be found if they hired the right expert. C. Asbestos: 1. Introduction. --Mississippi plaintiffs' attorney Richard F. "Dickie" Scruggs called them "magic" jurisdictions:
The trial lawyers have established relationships with the judges that are elected; they're State Court judges; they're populists. They've got large populations of voters who are in on the deal, they're getting their piece in many cases. And so, it's a political force in their jurisdiction, and it's almost impossible to get a fair trial if you're a defendant in some of these places. .. not won in the courtroom. They're won on the back roads long before the case goes to trial. Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in there and win the case, so it doesn't matter what the evidence or law is. 47 Scruggs made his first millions suing the asbestos companies in "magic" courtrooms. He made his first hundreds of millions suing the tobacco companies in the same places. He made millions more suing State Farm over its Katrina payments. After the harm was done, he went to prison in 2008 for bribing two of the "magic" judges in the asbestos and Katrina litigation,.
Few fields of tort litigation cut a broader swath through the American economy than asbestos. The Towers Perrin consulting firm estimates the total cost (compensation, attorney fees, and administrative expenses) of the U.S. tort system in 2003 at $246 billion. Of that, $9 billion was from asbestos. 48 Asbestos was a miracle insulator. It did not conduct electricity. It did not burn. It absorbed sound. It was nonreactive with chemicals. Yet asbestos, if breathed could injure, and even kill, particular in combination with tobacco smoke. After a 20-to 40-year latency period, they could cause diseases ranging from asbestosis to mesothelioma to lung cancer. Asbestos is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mesothelioma and asbestosis, and a contributing factor for lung cancer. Estimates of the number of people asbestos killed range widely, from 40,000 to over 300,000 ffrom 1965 to 2009. 49 Tort law is an odd vehicle for asbestos harm remediation, and in some ways profoundly inappropriate. The people clearly hurt were those who encountered asbestos at work. Yet employers and employees negotiate contracts with each other in competitive markets. Employers choose to hire an employee if he offers the right combination of attributes (talent, effort, experience) at the lowest price (wages, insurance, and other benefits). Employees choose to work for a given firm if it offers the best mix of pay, environment, location, and other amenities. If an employer imposes a health risk, employees will agree to work there only if the firm promises a pay-and-amenity package that compensates for the risk.
Employers and employees do not always understand all the risks involved. As in any other contract, the optimal legal rule is the one that induces them to invest costjustified (but only cost-justified) resources in studying potential harms. The rule which does best is the rule that holds them to their promises, that bans intentional false statements, and that lets residual harms lie where they fall.
It has long been known that asbestos injures health. It is commonly written that Pliny the Elder suggested the use of respirators and noted that purchasers of slaves who had worked in asbestos mines should be mindful of their reduced lifespan. 50 At least as early as 1918, insurance companies were declining life insurance coverage to asbestos workers. 51 Henry Johns, founder of the largest asbestos company, Johns-Manville, died in 1898 of "dust phthisis pneumonitis. 52 The very name of the ailment "asbestosis," coined in 1925, suggests that the danger was known. 53 Workers may not have read Pliny, but surely they realized that breathing rock fibers was not healthful. The court concluded in the 1973 leading case that the plaintiff worker knew that his breathing of asbestos was bad for him, that workers frequently discussed the danger, and that the danger was wellknown in the medical literature:
